ID Cards: Useful, or the beginning of a 1984 state?

[Ellie]

Can somebody please explain to me what this Individual Sovereignty pertains to that keeps being thrown around

 

[So fist]

Thank goodness I'm not born in America...

But anyway from what I have read it seems as though you brits will have all your information compiled into a public records database...
If you want individual sovereignty that is not the way to go >.<

If you are a US citizen you got one, kid.

 

[Velocir_X]

Yes I'm a US citizen since this February
but do to the fact that I am born outside of the country it is more difficult for people to predict my SSN

 

[Incognitus]

If it can make identity theft a much harder crime to commit then £300 may be a worthy investment.

There are three leading methods of identity theft:

1.) Taking someone's details during internet transactions.
2.) The misplacement or theft of cards or letters with a person's details upon them.
3.) Cracking a database and leeching the information from it.

So the government is going to solve this problem by consolidating everything into a single file, require you to use it constantly in every civil transaction including those taking place online in their new "egov" schemes.

So it won't be secure at all. Far from it, it will actually be a boon to criminals.

Australia and America both have greater problems with identity theft than the UK precisely because they are over reliant on single reference sources. The Dutch have had a similar problem, especially seeing as the cards they use have been shown to be easily readable by third-parties at a distance, and they are using the same technology as the proposed UK database.

And of course, once parties unknown have *everything* on you including things such as biometrics, you're pretty screwed.

And you are forced in those cases. You want to use the Internet? Then you've got to use an ISP, and you've got to use a web browser. While you can pick and choose which ISP and browser, there are only a few to choose from and you have to use one of them. (And while you aren't forced to use the Internet, you are also not forced to live in Britain).

...which is contingent on my deciding to use the internet - and I can still decide not to use the internet. Still the comparison doesn't stand. Are you suggesting that the 1 in 5 people who oppose the ID card on principle should leave the country Wyatt?

If nobody did things just because it would cost money then nothing would ever get done.

That's not what I said, Wyatt: It's a waste of money. We're paying an absurd amount for unproven, insecure database which currently has no ceiling. The money can be better spent, or (astonishingly) there's always the option to give it back to the people who earned it.

Under the scheme the Home Office takes a large swathe of executive powers, especially seeing as the extension or revision of the database, once in action, is an extra-parliamentary decision.
The database has limited oversight, with little to stop the information being abused: the state have not made it clear what measures are in place to deal with the inevitably large numbers of identifications, or deliberate attacks or corruption of what is going to be a vital piece of national software. How much does this cost?

And worst of all, it makes an individual's inalienable right to civic life entirely dependent upon the state - even if I don't have a car, I must contact the state and inform them occasionally that I do not have a car.

Considering the dependency we would have on this database

What I want to know is, what information could you possibly have that the Government want access to, that you wouldn't be willing to give? And, furthermore, why?

You've never heard of third party abuse?

There are hundreds of people across the country who have ever reason not to disclose things such as their ethnicity, whereabouts, car registration numbers etc into an unsecure database. Those fleeing foreign governments for instance. The example has already been brought up of Google parting with the names of Chinese dissidents to the Chinese state. Or how about something more local and domestic, spousal abuse for instance?
You know, some people might not want their medical or psychiatric records (or any other "notes" which the state feels it has the right to make a note of on your file) being as accessible to the DVLA - such as religious or sexual issues.

 

[CrapFactory]

The only issue is security and cost. Other then that I don't care. We obviously cannot afford it right now though.

 

[rey meustrus]

I wish that government officials could get some technology experts on these things. It feels like whenever there's some big plan to rely more on technology, they're basically relying on some Microsoft spokesperson saying "Sure it won't crash or get viruses." Anybody that knows better should disbelieve. Hell, I wouldn't trust any electronic system to be 100% infallible to store information.

I would like to see laws protecting privacy, whether they happen before or after an ID system is put in place. I guess I'm speaking internationally here. It's definitely wrong that internet companies like Google or Myspace have ultimate authority to remember, store, and copy information that you give them. It's even more wrong that they can, if they say so, obtain copyright to your works if you post them on their website, including the right to maintain the information even beyond your desire to bring it offline, or even sell it without reimbursement. For all of the concern the American government seems to have about individuals exercising their ability to digitally copy material which doesn't belong to them (because that wasn't possible before, so it has to be illegal now), I'm appalled that no government has imposed restrictions on companies collecting information (often in insecure databases where it can be stolen) and selling it (this wasn't possible before, so it has to be LEGAL now!).

Any plan to make a centralized database containing this information must have:

1) Tremendous oversight, conducted similar to scientific research; i.e. double blind (regulators don't know whom they are seeing in the database, legislators don't know when it's being regulated...).

2) Database must be secure, so that ONLY authorized access will be allowed.

3) Necessarily, database must be accessed sparingly, and with good reason. Buying a toothbrush isn't good reason. Even buying a car and applying for credit shouldn't be good enough. It should be limited to law enforcement, and the law enforcement must be limited in the ways it can acquire and use the information, subject to a warrant.

4) Database must be unique, so that other entities cannot maintain their own databases containing the same information. This includes Google logging your search habits, your phone company logging the calls you make, your grocer logging the groceries you buy...there are legitimate uses for this information, such as improving product quality and availability, but the illegitimate uses are impossible to prevent if such information is allowed to be maintain.

5) Database must be above politics. A separate administration must be formed to query the database (or allow other administrations access). This administration must be free of all repercussion from any agencies of power (like executive or legislative authority), but vulnerable to regulatory agencies (so that they don't themselves use the database for immediate political purposes).

6) Database must be regulated by a third party that is disinterested in the use of the database, and whose only purpose is maintaining that it be used lawfully.


Of course, all of this is bollocks if the government just WANTS to have a massive spy database, in which case they will never impose these requirements, or if they do, they will be ignored/abolished as soon as they want to use it. That, however, is what journalism is for: to expose unlawful or immoral uses of political power. Unfortunate that journalists are falling asleep all over the world.

 

[Incognitus]

The prospective national ID card was broken and cloned in 12 minutes, the Daily Mail revealed this morning.

The newspaper hired computer expert Adam Laurie to test the security that protects the information embedded in the chip on the card.

Using a Nokia mobile phone and a laptop computer, Laurie was able to copy the data on a card that is being issued to foreign nationals in minutes.

He then created a cloned card, and with help from another technology expert, changed all the data on the new card. This included the physical details of the bearer, name, fingerprints and other information.

He then rewrote data on the card, reversing the bearer's status from "not entitled to benefits" to "entitled to benefits".

He then added fresh content that would be visible to any police officer or security official who scanned the card, saying, "I am a terrorist - shoot on sight."

According to the paper, Home Office officials said the foreign nationals card uses the same technology as the UK citizens card that will be issued from 2012.

http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/ ... inutes.htm


Changing the data from "Not entitled to benefits" to "Entitled to Benefits" is a very Daily Maily thing to do, eh?!

 

[rey meustrus]

I'm more intrigued by the decision to add "I am a terrorist - shoot on sight" to the card.

This proves (in the most common way, through journalism) that my 2nd point has not been fulfilled. A security flaw like that is very common with government-run technology, and I think that needs to be fixed. What's the point of making a super-special ID card to prove identity if it can be easily hacked?

 

[Incognitus]

I'm more intrigued by the decision to add "I am a terrorist - shoot on sight" to the card.

You know, I completely missed that!

I suppose they're both a bit of hyperbole... I mean, it's not like the government has a database with our names in it with a note about whether we should be shot on sight... Is it?

 

[Ceroscuro]

So the problem here (and the debate between Wyatt and Incognitus) is that like... security and convenience are most often polar opposites. You can't really have both (at least in this kind of situation).

Before I scrolled to read Incognitus's post about it being cracked, I was going to say something similar. My university uses card swipe to get into locked doors and stuff, and a small group of computer science students were able to crack that in their free time (luckily the students were doing it to prove the point of its lack of security and not to cause trouble). I'm sure a whole nation would put more into an ID card than my school, but I'm also sure real criminals would put more into cracking it.

At the end of the day, electronics are all just logic and code, and both of those can be reverse-engineered (at least in this kind of situation). I don't think it's very secure.

This is the kind of thing that I think is great in an ideal world, but that's not the world we live in.

HOWEVER, having said that, I do approve of having SOME information on a generic ID card of sorts. Driver's licenses (at least in the US) are getting there. For things that aren't REALLY important, it's a great, convenient form of ID. I can (and have) walk into an airport with my stuff and just swipe my license in a machine to print my ticket. Convenient! (followed by 30 minutes waiting at security...)

It's a great idea, I think it's just before its time. If it could be pulled off right, it would work well. Especially if there are different tiers and/or groups for accessing information (e.g. most people have access to your name, but only hospitals may have access to your medical records).

AFTERTHOUGHT: Maybe they should just make a card form of your Google account... they already probably have most of your information anyway...

 

[j4kl1ng3r]

An ISP directs to a computer, not to a human being.

 

[rey meustrus]

An ISP directs to a computer, not to a human being.

An IP address can be located down to a neighborhood, if not directly to your house. Also, the ISP has your information associated with your account (which they need to get payment for their services). So while it only points to a computer, that computer is directly associated with you (via your ISP) and your house (via your IP, unless you're using a proxy).

Your online data is not private. It may seem private, but it's not. Take e-mail, for example. You might be the only person who knows your e-mail password, but you're not the only person who can read your e-mail. Your e-mail provider can read it too — along with anyone he gives access to. That can include any backbone provider who happened to route that mail from the sender to you. In addition, if you read your e-mail from work, various people at your company have access to it, too. And, if they have taps at the correct points, so can the police, the U.S. National Security Agency, and any other well-funded national intelligence organization — along with any hackers or criminals sufficiently skilled to break into one of these sites.

...

These risks are new. Twenty years ago, if someone wanted to look through your correspondence, they had to break into your house. Now, they can just break into your ISP. Ten years ago, your voicemail was on an answering machine in your office; now it's on a computer owned by a telephone company. Your financial accounts are on remote Web sites protected only by passwords; your credit history is collected, stored and sold by companies whose names you probably don't even know. Your digital data is no longer under your control.

And more data is being generated. Lists of everything you buy, and everything you look at but choose not to buy, are stored by online merchants both in Japan and abroad. A record of everything you browse can be stored by your ISP if they choose to. What were cash transactions are now credit card transactions. What used to be a face-to- face chat is now an e-mail, instant message, or SMS conversation — or maybe a conversation within Mixi or Facebook.

...

Anonymity doesn't help much. Mixi might not know your real name and address, but there are many ways to link your identity to your account. Maybe your e-mail address identifies you or your ISP knows who you are. Your cell phone identifies you and your computer might, too. Use a credit card from your account and that identifies you. True anonymity is very difficult; we regularly identify ourselves online even if we think we do not.

The lesson in all of this is that little we do is ephemeral anymore. We leave electronic audit trails everywhere we go, with everything we do. This won't change: We can't turn back technology. But as technology makes our conversations less ephemeral, we need laws to step in and safeguard our privacy. We need comprehensive data privacy laws, protecting our data and communications regardless of where it is stored or how it is processed. We need laws forcing companies to keep it private and delete it as soon as it is no longer needed, and laws giving us the right to delete our data from third-party sites. And we need international cooperation to ensure that companies cannot flaunt data privacy laws simply by moving themselves offshore.

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nc20090819a1.html